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Reward-Aided Sensing Task Execution in Mobile
Crowdsensing Enabled by Energy Harvesting
Jiejun Hu, Kun Yang*, Senior Member Liang Hu and Kezhi Wang, Member IEEE
Abstract—Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a new sensing frame-
work that empowers normal mobile devices to participate in
sensing tasks. The key challenge that degrades the performance
of MCS is selfish mobile users who conserve the resources (e.g.,
CPU, battery and bandwidth) of their devices. Thus, we introduce
energy harvesting (EH) as rewards into MCS and thus provide
more possibilities to improve the quality of service (QoS) of the
system. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic approach for
achieving sustainable and higher-quality sensing task execution
in MCS. The proposed solution is implemented as a two-stage
game. The first stage of the game is the system reward game,
in which the system is the leader, who allocates the task and
reward, and the mobile devices are the followers who execute
the tasks. The second stage of the game is called the participant
decision-making game, in which we consider both the network
channel condition and participant’s abilities. We analyse the
features of the second stage of the game and show that the
game admits a Nash Equilibrium (NE). Based on the NE of the
second stage of the game, the system can admit a Stackelberg
Equilibrium, at which the utility is maximized. Simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve better
QoS and prolong the system lifetime while also providing a
proper incentive mechanism for MCS.
Index Terms—Task execution, energy harvest, game theory,
mobile crowdsensing.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS smartphones have changed people’s dailylives. The functions of smartphones become increasingly
powerful every day, and they have rich sensory capabilities.
Smartphones not only allow us to communicate with each
other but also offer the possibilities of sensing the environment
and collecting, processing and sharing information. These
technologies empower the development of mobile crowdsens-
ing (MCS). MCS is widely applied in our daily lives and
in areas such as environment monitoring, personal health-
care, virtual reality entertainment, transportation monitoring
and smart city applications [1]–[4]. It has the advantages of
mobility, scalability and cost effectiveness, comparing to the
traditional Internet of things. Moreover, the integration of
human intelligence into the mobile sensing and computing
process is also a special aspect of MCS. This means that
people can decide how to and when to be a member of MCS.
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For a typical MCS procedure, first, the MCS server will
publish the sensing task to a special area. Then, the participant
recruiting procedure based on performance, reputation etc.,
will be triggered. All participants will begin to execute the
sensing task: sensing, executing sensing data and returning the
results to the server. When the sensing task is relatively easy,
sensing and executing will not cause the heavy consumption
of energy or other resources by the mobile devices. However,
when a tough sensing task is allocated, such as multimedia
data sensing and mining, participants know they have to spend
more resources to accomplish the task, so some of them may
choose to leave without a proper task execution plan and
incentive mechanism.
Incentive mechanism is the most important issue which
needs to be considered in MCS. A proper incentive mechanism
can make sure the participants in MCS to donate their resource
to achieve a common interest. To simulate mobile user to
become a participant and remain the number of the partici-
pants, researchers have designed extensive method to provide
the incentive mechanism. They adopt money, reputation and
credit as reward to participants to guarantee the sensing quality
[5], [6].
In our work, energy harvesting (EH) is envisioned as a
promising way to address the challenge of incentive mech-
anism. EH can capture recyclable external energy, including
solar, indoor lightening, vibrational, chemical and human
motion energies [7]. The utilization of EH devices in MCS
will provide new features, such as self-sustainability, coverage
of sensing area and the quality of sensing result. In this paper,
we adopt EH devices in MCS. The system will use the energy
that can be harvested by the participants as a reward.
In the traditional MCS sensing task execution, participants
only can choose to be a member and donate their own resource
or choose not to be involved at all. However the traditional
method maybe reduce the possibility of a potential participant
by only two choices: to do or not to do. In our work, we in-
troduce computation offloading [8], [9] into MCS sensing task
execution. Thus, the participants can make different choices by
analyse their resource. In addition of EH, participants’ battery
can be maintained and the sensing life of the system can be
prolonged.
In this paper, we adopt a game theoretic solution to address
the reward-aided sensing task execution in MCS, in addition
to the QoS and system lifetime of MCS. Game theory focuses
on the features of participant competition and interactions
[7], [10], [11]. In an MCS sensing environment, any action
taken by a participant affects the decisions of others in the
mobile network. Thus, game theory is a natural mathematical
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Fig. 1. Mobile Crowdsensing with Energy Harvesting Scenario
approach for studying this interaction. In this paper, the
Stackelberg leadership model is a promising way to provide an
incentive mechanism and solve the reward allocation problem,
which enables the system and the participants to maximize
their utilities at the same time [12], [13].
In this paper, we study the issue of reward-aided sensing
task execution, in addition to sustainable system lifetime in
MCS, and model it as a two-stage Stackelberg game. EH as
a reward will also act as the incentive mechanism in MCS.
This approach will reduce the energy consumption of mobile
users. By giving different participants different rewards, this
approach helps to control the sensing quality of the data. In
summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Reward-aided sensing task execution game formula-
tion: The proposed Stackelberg game consists two parts.
The first stage of the game is a system reward game
(SRG). In the SRG, the system that allocates the tasks and
reward is the leader, and the mobile devices that execute
the tasks are the followers. The second stage of the game
is called a participant decision-making game(PDG); both
the system and mobile devices are players in the second
stage. The strategy of the system is the optimal reward,
and the optimal strategy of the participants is how to
execute the task.
• Properties of the game: The PDG in the framework
ensures that the SRG has an optimal result. Because the
sub-game has an NE, all the mobile devices can achieve
a mutual satisfaction. As a result of the sub-game, the
participants in MCS will be separated into two groups:
those who offload the task and those who execute the task
locally. Based on their different decisions in sensing task
execution, the system will allocate the reward to different
participants.
• Reward-aided sensing task execution mechanism and
main algorithms: The proposed Stackelberg game is
achieved by two main algorithms, which operate in
tandem: In PDG, algorithm1 takes communication inter-
ference, computation time and energy into account and
achieves the Nash equilibrium of the decision-making
game. In SRG, based on the result of algorithm1, al-
gorithm 2 can achieve the optimal reward amount and
allocate the reward.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we discuss the related works. The system model is
introduced in section III. The Stackelberg game and reward-
aided sensing task execution mechanism are presented in sec-
tions IV and V, respectively. The performance and simulation
of the mechanism are analysed in section VI. In section VII,
we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The incentive mechanism and sensing quality play crucial roles
in MCS. Related works have showed different incentive mech-
anisms: they adopt money, reputation and credit as rewards for
participants [5], [6].
In [14], two types of incentive mechanisms are intro-
duced: a user-centric model based on the Stackelberg game
and a system-centric model based on auction. In [15], the
authors proposed a new crowdsensing framework, namely,
social network assisted trustworthiness assurance (SONATA),
which aims to maximize the crowdsensing platform utility
and minimize the manipulation probability through vote-based
trustworthiness analysis in a dynamic social network architec-
ture. [16] designed an inventive mechanism for discrete crowd-
sensing in which each user has a uniform sensing subtask
length. The objection of this work is to maximize the platform
utility and achieve perfect Bayesian equilibrium. [17] studied
the incentive mechanisms for a novel Mobile Crowdsensing
Scheduling problem, which achieved desirable truthfulness,
individual rationality and computational efficiency. However
there is no work which takes energy as a reward in MCS.
In our work, energy plays a significant role in MCS, because
energy as a reward can guarantee the quantity of the partici-
pants, and then sustain the coverage of sensing area, all these
improve the QoS in MCS.
For the sensing quality of MCS, Jin et al. [18] proposed
a reverse auction approach for the incentive mechanism of
MCS based on quality of information (QoI). In [19], the
authors presented a framework for green mobile crowdsensing
that utilized a quality-driven sensor management function
to continuously select the k-best sensors for a predefined
sensing task. In [20], a novel approach was proposed that
uses the techniques of evolutionary algorithms to determine
the optimal trade-off between data quality and cost. In our
work, we adopt computation offloading as an additional option
for the participants. Computation offloading make it possible
to execute heavy sensing task in the cloud and return the result
directly back to the server. Budgets in MCS is also an essential
parameter when MSC platform maximizes the sensing qual-
ity. [21] proposed a novel task allocation framework called
CrowdTasker for MCS. CrowdTasker aims to maximize the
coverage quality of the sensing task under a budget constraint
by greedy algorithm. [22] and [23] proposed a framework to
achieve the optimal coverage quality under budget constraint.
For EH, this approach is widely applied in many scenarios
in wireless sensor networks [24]–[28]. Wang et al. [29] studied
joint channels and power allocation to improve the energy effi-
ciency of user equipment by analysing the batteries of the user
equipments. In [30], Mao et al. investigated a green mobile-
edge computing system with energy harvesting devices and de-
veloped an effective computation offloading strategy. In [31], a
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tractable model was developed for analysing the performance
of downlink heterogeneous cellular networks with both power-
grid-connected base stations and energy harvesting small cell
access points. In [32], energy harvesting has also been taken
into consideration in cognitive radio sensor networks (CRSNs).
It addressed a network utility maximization problem which is
greatly impacted by sampling rate control and channel access
schedule, under the harvested energy, channel capacity and
interference constraints.
Our work is inspired by the works on the interference among
the users in mobile networks and a game theoretic approach for
maximizing the system utility [14], [33]. However, our work
differs the above mentioned related works in the following
ways: (a) we consider interference among participants in
MCS to propose an efficient sensing task execution approach.
(b) we adopt EH as a reward in the incentive mechanism,
which prolongs the system lifetime of MCS. (c) our work
faces a multi-parameter environment where the participants
information is multi-dimensional.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We introduce the system model of MCS in this section. As
shown in Fig. 1, we consider in a framework that consists of a
set of participants P = {1, 2, ..., p},where participant i will be
assigned a sensing task Ti = {Bi, Di} to be executed, which is
published by the system. Here, Bi denotes the data size of the
computation input data (which including the sensing data and
the execution code), and Di denotes the required CPU cycles
of participant i. There is a wireless base station that allows
participants to offload computations to the cloud. Participants
in MCS can decide whether to execute locally or to offload
the task to the cloud via the wireless network. We denote
by di as the sensing task execution decision of participant i.
Specifically, we have di = 0 if the participant will execute the
sensing task locally, and di = 1 if the participant chooses to
offload the task. The decision profile is d = {d1, d2, ...dn}. In
this scenario, EH is a special feature of the MCS participants.
Hence, the sensing task execution model, EH model and
network conditions in MCS will be discussed. We will focus
on the efficient sensing tasks execution procedure and the
energy-aided incentive mechanism in MCS.
A. Task Execution model
In MCS, there are two potential ways to execute the sensing
tasks. Participants can choose either of them to maximize their
utility. In this section, we introduce the sensing task execution
model in MCS.
1) Local Execution Model: We consider each i ∈ P has a
sensing task Ti, which is published by the system. We will
discuss execution delay and energy consumption of the local
execution model.
For local execution, a participant will execute the task with
the local resources of the mobile device and generate the
sensing result ri with data size Bri , B
r
i can be larger or smaller
than the sensing task size Bi based on the sensing task. The
computational capacity of the participant i is denoted as Fi.
The local execution delay T l1i and energy consumption E
l1
i
can be expressed as follows:
T l1i =
Di
Fi
(1)
El1i = ϕDi (2)
where ϕ = KF 2i denotes the energy consumption per CPU
cycle, K is energy coefficient based on the structure of
the chips [34]. In sensing result transmission process, the
transmission delay T l2i and energy cost E
l2
i can be expressed
as follows:
T l2i =
Bri
Ri
(3)
where Ri is the data transmission rate of participant i. Based
on (3), we can have the energy consumption of the result
transmission stage.
El2i = Pi
Bri
Ri
(4)
where Pi is the transmission power of participant i. According
to (1), (2), (3) and (4) we can obtain the local sensing task
execution cost Cli as:
Cli = w1(T
l1
i + T
l2
i ) + w2(E
l1
i + E
l2
i )
= w1(
Di
Fi
+
Bri
Ri
) + w2(ϕDi + Pi
Bri
Ri
) (5)
where w1, w2 ∈ (0, 1) are the coefficients of the execution de-
lay and energy consumption. Ri is the data rate for participant
i that we simply assume is the same to every local execution
participant due to the interference can be discarded. A partic-
ipant will compute the sensing cost before deciding whether
to execute the sensing task locally or in the cloud. Note that
execution delay and energy consumption are parameters with
different scales, so we will use a normalization method to
convert the parameters into a common scales.
2) Cloud Execution Model: In the cloud execution model,
the sensing task will be executed in the cloud. For a partici-
pant, the cost of cloud execution includes two parts: the delay
contributed by transmission in the network and execution in
the cloud and the energy consumption of offloading the sensing
task. The execution delay of the cloud execution model is
denoted as T oi , which is given by
T oi =
Bi
Ri(d)
+
Di
F ci
(6)
where Ri(d) is different from Ri in (4), because interference
will happen when participants decide to offload the sensing
task. And F ci is the computational ability of the cloud which
we assume the system will offer every participant the same
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computation ability. We denoted the energy consumption in
the cloud execution model as Eoi :
Eoi = Pi ·
Bi
Ri(d)
(7)
According to (5) and (6), we can compute the cost of the cloud
execution, which is denoted as Coi :
Coi = w1(
Bi
Ri(d)
+
Di
F ci
) + w2Pi
Bi
Ri(d)
(8)
B. Network Model
Due to the scenario of MCS, when a big amount of mobile
devices begin to offload the sensing task to the cloud, the
communication interference among the participants need to
be considered about. In the mobile network, the base station
can manage the communications of all mobile users, including
uplink and downlink communications. The data transmission
rate of participant i is a logarithmic function of SINR. SINR
is denoted as γi(d) [33], [35]
Ri(d) = f(γi(d))
= f(
PiHi,b
σ2 +
∑
m∈P,m6=i,dm=1 PmHm,b
)
=W log2(1 +
PiHi,b
σ2 +
∑
m∈P,m6=i,dm=1 PmHm,b
)
(9)
where Pi and Hi,b represent the transmission power of par-
ticipant i and channel gain between the participant i and
base station, respectively; σ2 denotes the noise power level,
including noise power and interference power. According
to the equations above, if too many participants decide to
offloading the sensing task, SINR will decrease, interference
will incur and lead to low data rates, which negatively affect
MCS. Thus in the offloading phrase, the interference needs to
be taken into consideration.
IV. REWARD-AIDED SENSING TASK EXECUTION GAME
In MCS, the system is interested in maximizing its utility
while publishing the tasks and rewards for the participants.
At the same time, the participants who own the mobile
devices are both selfish and rational; hence, they also want to
maximize their own utility. The participant must compute the
cost of execution based on communication interference, energy
consumption and battery level. If the system will give the him
a reward that is not less than the cost, then he will participate
in MCS. Firstly in our work, we assume that the system would
like to have more participants to offload the sensing task to the
cloud, due to the capacity of the cloud and the transmission
delay of local execution. Thus there will be more reward that
will be allocated to the offloading participants.
The proposed reward-aided sensing task execution mecha-
nism is achieved by Stackelberg game, where the system is
the leader who moves first in the game and the participants
are the followers. In Stackelberg game, there are two stages:
Stage 1: SRG
Strategy: reward
Objective: system cost minimization
Stage 2: PDG
Strategy: how to participate
Objective: profit maximization
s.t. the interference of the channel
Stackelberg Game
Reward d=f(reward)
Fig. 2. Stackelberg Game
an SRG, in which the system provides reward for users who
participate in computation and a PDG, in which participants
can decide by themselves whether to offload the sensing task
or execute it locally according to the reward from the system.
In order the solve the whole Stacketlberg game, we need to
solve the second stage of the game (PDG) first based on the
reward from the system [36].
Before starting, there are serval important questions regard-
ing the game, the first of which is how to choose a reasonable
Utility Function (UF). After a UF has been selected, we must
determine what kind of strategy a participant can choose to
maximize or minimize the UF; in another words, what is the
best response of a participant? Moreover, will a stable state
(NE) exist for all the participants? If the system can achieve
NE, will it be unique? In this section, we will address several
important questions while formulating the two-stage game.
A. Utility Functions
1) Stage One of Stackelberg Game : In an SRG, the leader
is the system, who makes the first move in the game, and
the followers are the mobile users. The UF of the system
is the cost of the system after allocating the reward to the
participants, which can be formulated as
US =
p∑
i=1
EiI(di=1) +
p∑
i=1
E′iI(di=0) (10)
where I is an indicator function, if di = 1 is true, then the
indicator function is true and vice versa. In equation (10), Ei
denotes as the reward for offloading participants and E′i as the
reward to local participants. E′i = εEi for local participants
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2839582, IEEE Access
5
TABLE I
NOTATION AND DESCRIPTIONS
Notation Description
P = {1, 2, ...n} set of participators
Fi Participator i’s computation ability
Di i’s Required CPU circles of the sensing task
Bi computation input data size
Bri Sensing result of participant i
Ri Uplink data rate for participator i
F c Computation ability of the cloud
W Channel bandwidth
Pi Transmission power of participant i
Hi,b Channel gain between participant i and base station
a1, a2, b1, b2, w1, w2 Weights
d = d1, d2, ..., dn Decision profile of participators
eci i’s energy consumption
ehi i’s harvested energy
eni i’s new energy level after energy harvesting
eii i’s initial energy level
eb i’s battery ability
where ε is constant. In the first stage of Stackelberg game, the
goal is to minimize the cost of the system, which implies
min
d,Ei
US
s.t. Ei ≥ Eoi ∀i ∈ P
E′i ≥ El1i + El2i ∀i ∈ P
(11)
2) Stage two of Stackelberg Game : The participant i’s
utility function is the profit he can make by obtaining reward
from the system minus the cost of sensing task executions
UPi =
{
Ei − Coi if di = 1
E′i − Cli if di = 0
(12)
where Ei and E′i are different rewards he can obtain from
different sensing task execution plan. In the second stage of
Stackelberg game, the utility function of participant should be
maximized for each participants.
max
d
UPi (13)
B. Game formulation and Property
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). (d∗, E∗i ) is a
Stackelberg Equilibrium for the proposed game if it satisfied
the following conditions for any value of (d, Ei)
US(E
∗
i , d
∗) ≥ US(Ei, d∗)
UPi (d
∗
i , d−i) ≥ UPi (d′i, d−i)
(14)
According to definition 1, the Stackelberg Equilibrium can
be obtained as follow: in PDG, equilibrium depends on the
followers’ optimal response of sensing task execution plan
where they will obtain the optimal strategy profile d∗. In SRG,
system uses the optimal strategy profile of PDG to obtain the
optimal reward E∗i for the participants. Therefore, we need to
analysis the PDG first, to solve the SRG.
First, we define the Best Response (BR) in the PDG. The
BR is a central concept in game theory. It is a strategy that
produces the maximum profit for a player in the game, given
the other players’ strategies.
Definition 2 (Best Response in a Decision-making Game).
Participant i’s strategy d∗i is the Best Response to strategies
d−i of other participants, if
UPi (d
∗
i , d−i) > U
P
i (d
′
i, d−i) ∀di ∈ d, d∗i 6= d′i (15)
In a PDG, all the participants will act according to their BR
when playing the game. Hence, the PDG will eventually reach
a stable point, which we call it NE.
C. Solution of Stackelberg Game
1) Stage2 – PDG: In order to solve the Stackelberg game,
we apply backward induction. First we need to solve the
second stage of the game. We take the reward Ei and E′i
as given in stage 2.
Theorem 1 (Best Response strategy) According to Defi-
nition 2 and the action profile of participant i is di = {0, 1},
where 0 means local execution and 1 means cloud execution.
Here we will discuss which action of the participant is the best
response towards to other participants’ actions. We assume the
best response of participant i is d∗i , according to the fixed
strategy profile d−i of other participants. Thus we have
UPi (d
∗
i , d−i) =
{
Ei − Coi + UPi (d−i) if d∗i = 1
E′i − Cli + UPi (d−i) if d∗i = 0
(16)
in BR d∗i 6= d′i, thus we assume when d∗i = 1, we obtain
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UPi (1, d−i) > U
P
i (0, d−i)
where we have
Ei − Coi + UPi (d−i) ≥ E′i − Cli + UPi (d−i)
Coi − Cli ≤ Ei − E′i
on the other hand, when d∗i = 0, we have
Coi − Cli ≥ Ei − E′i (17)
As it shows in (17), we need to discuss the relation between
Cli and C
o
i . According to (5) and (8), we have the left side of
(17)
w1(
Bi
Ri(d)
+
Di
F c
) + w2Pi
Bi
Ri(d)
− Cli
where we can find out the data rate when participants offload
the sensing task to the cloud will strongly effect the cost of
sensing task execution. Based on (9) when all the participants
want to offloading the task, they will suffer a high interference
in the channel. This will cause the increasing of the cost of
offloading. Thus in PNG, the best response is when participant
try to choose the cloud execution, which implies
d∗i =
{
1 if Coi − Cli ≤ Ei − E′i
0 otherwise
(18)
To simplify the problem, we assume all the participants are
homogenous, which means they are under the same chan-
nel condition and same transmission power, thus P1H1,s =
P2H2,s = ... = PpHp,s = k. Based on d∗i = 1 is the the
best response of participants i. According to (9) and (18), we
obtain
0 <
p∑
i=1
kI(di=1) ≤
k
2
w1Bi+w2BiPi
(Cl
i
+Ei−E′i−w1
Di
Fc
i
)W − 1
− σ2 (19)
When
∑p
i=1 kI(di=1) is out of the range of (19), the utility
function will decrease, so the participants will choose to
execute locally. We can obtain the strategy profile d∗ of the
participants
p∑
i=1
I(di=1) =
1
2
w1Bi+w2BiPi
(Cl
i
+Ei−E′i−w1
Di
Fc
i
)W − 1
− σ
2
k
(20)
2) Stage1 – SRG: From Stage2, we obtain the optimal
strategy profile d∗. Now we will solve Stage1. According to
(10) and (19), in addition with E′i = εEi, we obtain
min
d∗,Ei
n∑
i=1
EiI(di=1) +
n∑
i=1
εEiI(di=0)
= (
1
2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1
− σ
2
k
)Ei
+ (n− ( 1
2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1
− σ
2
k
))εEi
= (1− ε)( 1
2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1
− σ
2
k
)Ei
+ εnEi
(21)
where
Ai = w1Bi + w2BiPi
Bi = (C
l
i − w1
Di
F ci
)W
Ci = (1− ε)W
and n is the total number of the participants in MCS. In Stage1,
we want to find out the smallest value of function (24).Thus,
the derivative of (24) is
d(US)
d(Ei)
=
(1− ε)(2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1)
(2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1)2
+
AiCiln2(1− ε)Ei2
Ai
Bi+CiEi
1
(Bi+CiEi)2
(2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1)2
− [(1− ε)σ
2
k
− εn]
(22)
where ε ∈ (0, 1),Ai, Bi, Ci > 0. And then we need to discuss
about the second derivative of (23), namely
d2(US)
d(Ei)2
=
d
d(Ei)
[
(1− ε)(2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1)+
(2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1)2
+
AiCiln2(1− ε)Ei2
Ai
Bi+CiEi
1
(Bi+CiEi)2
(2
Ai
Bi+CiEi − 1)2
]
(23)
According to (23), we can easily find out d
2(US)
d(Ei)2
is positive,
thus (22) is concave. Setting the first derivative of US to 0,
we obtain the estimated Ei
Emini =
Ai −Bi
Ci(
σ2
k − εn1−ε )
− Bi
Ci
(24)
According to the range of Ei, namely
Ei =
{
max[Eoi , E
l1
i + E
l2
i ] if E
min
i < E
o
i , (E
l1
i + E
l2
i )
Emini else
(25)
According to (25), we can obtain the optimal reward from
system to every participants individually based on how the
participants execute the sensing task.
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D. Energy Harvest Model
Now we introduce the battery level update of each participant
after reward allocated. The mobile devices in the MCS are
equipped with EH components.
We use ECi , Ei, E
N
i , E
I
i and E
B
i to denote the energy
consumption, the energy that can be harvested as reward, the
new energy level, the initial energy level and battery capability
of the participants, respectively. According to (2), (4), (7), we
have
ECi =
{
Eoi
El1i + E
l2
i
(26)
According to energy aided reward in MCS, we have
ENi =
{
EBi if E
I
i − ECi + EHi ≥ EBi
EIi − ECi + EHi otherwise
(27)
Equation (27) shows the new battery level of participants after
energy harvesting.
V. REWARD-AIDED SENSING TASK EXECUTION
MECHANISM
In this section, we introduce the reward-aided sensing task
execution mechanism and the main algorithms. We suppose
that the system publishes a sensing task that requires the
mobile devices in the specific area to record a video for data
mining.
A. Mechanism Design
• The system will announce the task to all the participants
in the specific area, including all the parameters of the
sensing task (the size of the task, required CPU, etc.) and
the reward to the participants based on different sensing
task execution plan;
• Based on the parameters of the sensing task, the param-
eters of the participants (battery level, bandwidth, data
plan, and CPU), the channel in the mobile network and
the reward, the participants will decide whether to execute
the sensing task locally or offload it to the server;
• The system will allocate the rewards to different par-
ticipants based on the sensing task execution plan. The
participants will get the energy and renew their battery
level;
• The cost of system is optimized and the lifetime of the
system will be prolonged.
B. Main Algorithms
Based on Theorem 1, Algorithm 1 is designed to achieve
optimal strategy profile in a decision-making game. In other
words, after the algorithm 1 has been carried out, all the par-
ticipants will be separated into two groups. In this algorithm,
first the cost of execution will be calculated and the difference
will be ranked in ascending order; then, based on the best
response, the participants will make different decisions. Here
Algorithm 1 Participators Decision-making Game
1: Input: metrics of channel, task, participators’ ability and
reward
2: Output: d∗
3: Let Coi [c
o
1 . . . c
o
i ], C
l
i [c
l
1 . . . c
l
i] and d[d1 . . . di] be new
arrays
4: Let i = 1
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: Ci = C
o
i − Cli
7: end for
8: Sort Ci in ascending order
9: Let j = 1
10: for j = 1 to n do
11: if
∑n
i=1 kI(di=1) ≤ k
2
w1Bi+w2BiPi
(Cl
i
+Ei−E′i−w1
Di
Fc
i
)W
−1
− σ2 then
12: dj = 1
13: d∗ = dj
⋃
d
14: end if
15: end for
in Algorithm1, we obtain the optimal decision profile of the
second stage of Stackelberg game. Algorithm 2 determines the
reward that will be allocated to the participants. We adopt the
result of the solution of stage1 to find the optimal reward for
the system to allocate to the participants. It is based on the
utility functions of the SRG.
Algorithm 2 System Reward Allocation
1: Input: d
2: Output: reward Ei and the new battery level ENi
3: Let reward = 1
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: if di 6= 0 then
6: i++
7: end if
8: end for
9: Ei = max(
Ai
σ2
k − εn1−ε
− BiCi , Pi BiRi(d) , 1ε (ϕDi + Pi
Bri
Ri
)
10: for j = 1 to n do
11: if di = 1 then
12: EIi − ECi + Ei
13: else
14: EIi − ECi + εEi
15: end if
16: end for
Here, we analyse the battery levels of all the participants
to determine whether the proposed mechanism can achieve
a longer system lifetime. Although system lifetime is an
important parameter in MCS, there has been little work in this
area. Therefore, a deeper collaborative approach for energy
harvesting in MCS will be developed in the future work.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of the reward-aided sensing task
execution mechanism and its algorithms by performing sim-
ulations. The simulation results are obtained using MATLAB
on a computer with Intel i5 at 1.3 GHz.
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A. Simulation Setup
We simulate an MCS environment that consists of 20 partici-
pants with a sensing task with a data size of 420KB and 1000
Megacycles of required CPU. The computational capability of
each participant is randomly selected from 1.0, 0.8 and 0.5
GHz. The bandwidth of the channel is set as 5.5 MHz, the
transmission power is 100 mWatts, and the background noise
is -100 dBm. The capability of the cloud is 100 GHz.
To represent the sensing quality, we proposed the sensing
quality metric to measure the QoS of the system [37], which
is denoted by ψ
ψ =
∑p
i=1 σ1F
c
i I(di=1) +
∑p
i=1 σ2FiI(di=0)
Expected
(28)
where Expected is the expected quality level of the MCS
system; here, we set Expected = 100. The QoS index
indicates how MCS executes the sensing task; since the cloud
has more computation power for better executing the sensing
task, we set 1 > σ1 > σ2 > 0.
B. Performance Evaluation of the Rewarded-aided Sensing
Task Execution Mechanism
The following simulation results provide an insight into
the performance of the reward-aided sensing task execution
mechanism. The metrics that interest us include the utilities
of the system and participants, system lifetime and sensing
quality, along with the effects of the numbers of participants,
sensing task size and reward. The performance of the proposed
mechanism is also compared with that of traditional MCS
sensing task execution strategy, in which all tasks are sensed
and executed locally. In addition to the local strategy, we also
adopt a non-cooperative game as a new comparison [38]. In a
non-cooperative game, based on equation (12) the participant’s
utility function, the participants will compete according to a
fixed reward to maximize the utility by offloading sensing
task.Thus, we set a non-cooperative algorithm and local sens-
ing task execution as the benchmarks.
In Fig. 4, we show the utilities of system and participants
in the scenario in which the MCS system consists of 20
participants and a set reward, along with a task size range from
0 KB to 5000 KB. According to the figure, when the task size
is small, the values of the utilities are stable because most of
the participants will execute a small task locally. As the task
size increases, the participants’ utility decreases, while the sys-
tem’s utility increases. Note that the system’s and participants’
utilities intersect when the task size is approximately 1250 KB,
which means that in this scenario, the task size is optimal for
the MCS system. Compared to the proposed mechanism, the
utility of the traditional sensing task execution method is much
smaller due to the low computational capability.
System lifetime is a crucial metric in MCS and can indicate
how healthy an MCS is. In this paper, we adopt the reward-
aided mechanism to prolong the system lifetime of MCS.
We define that the system lifetime in terms of the lowest
battery level of the participants. Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show
the impacts of the sensing task size, reward and number of
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participants, respectively, on system lifetime. Fig. 5 shows the
result of both mechanism, with and without energy harvesting.
The proposed mechanism achieves a slower decrease and a
better lifetime than the other methods. Fig. 6 shows that with
the same reward, the proposed mechanism achieves a longer
lifetime than the traditional one. Moreover, it shows that when
the number of participants increases, the proposed mechanism
becomes less competitive since the number of participants
is not optimal for this special scenario. Fig. 7 shows how
the number of participants affects the system lifetime. As the
number of participant increases, the system life time stabilizes.
Fig. 8 shows the relation between reward and sensing qual-
ity. According to the figure, the sensing quality increases when
the reward increases because more participants will offload
the sensing task for execution, which achieves better quality.
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However, after a certain point, as the reward increases, the
sensing quality does not change. This is due to the interference
of the channel, as no more participants can offload the sensing
task.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a reward-aided sensing task execution mecha-
nism for MCS has been proposed. The proposed mechanism
aims to improve the sensing quality and prolong the system
lifetime by assigning energy as a reward to the participants.
The proposed mechanism adopts game theory to solve this
multi-objective optimization problem. The mechanism pre-
sented in this paper considers both the network channel condi-
tions and participants’ abilities and adopts energy as the reward
for the participants. Extensive simulations have demonstrated
the advantages of the proposed mechanism, which yields a
better QoS and a longer system lifetime for MCS.
In future work, we plan to make possible deeper collabora-
tion between energy harvesting and MCS. We will investigate
the sensing data and energy transmission in MCS to achieve
a better QoS of MCS.
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